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Abstract
One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to
games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can
a player’s marginal contribution—a central notion to the Shapley value—be defined in a variety of
ways, but it is also not obvious which axiomatization should be used. Consequently, a number of
authors extended the Shapley value using complex and often unintuitive axiomatizations. Further-
more, no algorithm to approximate any extension of the Shapley value to partition-function games
has been proposed to date. Given this background, we prove in this paper that, for any well-defined
measure of marginal contribution, Shapley’s original four axioms imply a unique value for games
with externalities. As an consequence of this general theorem, we show that values proposed by
Macho-Stadler et al., McQuillin and Bolger can be derived from Shapley’s axioms. Building upon
our analysis of marginal contribution, we develop a general algorithm to approximate extensions
of the Shapley value to games with externalities using a Monte Carlo simulation technique.
1 Introduction
Coalitional game theory provides a rich and compelling framework for modeling and understanding
cooperation in multi-agent systems [7]. Most research on coalitional games in the computer science
literature has been devoted to characteristic function games. The key component of such games is a
characteristic function, which assigns to every subset (or coalition) of agents a real number indicating
the value that the coalition could obtain through cooperation. An explicit assumption in this model is
that the value of any coalition is independent of how other agents choose to cooperate. However, in
many realistic settings, this assumption clearly does not hold. For example, an alliance of smartphone
producers who successfully convince clients to adopt their operating system can increase their market
position to the detriment of their competitors: this is an example of a negative externality. Positive
externalities are also possible, for example when one coalition achieves a goal that subsumes the goal
of another coalition. A key issue is then how to represent games that exhibit such externalities, and for
this purpose, partition function games were introduced by Lucas and Thrall [31]. In these games, the
value of a coalition is assumed to depend not just on the composition of that coalition, but on the other
coalitions that co-exist with it. Partition function games have recently received considerable attention
in the computer science community [27, 4, 22, 18, 9], and will be the focus of this paper.
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A key question in coalitional game theory is how the payoff that a coalition obtains through cooper-
ation should be divided among coalition members. Many payoff division schemes have been proposed,
of which the best known and most influential is due to Shapley [28]. Shapley argued that, in order to
ensure fairness, each agent should obtain a share in the payoff that is proportional to its marginal con-
tribution to the game, and this should be computed as a function of agents’ marginal contributions to
individual coalitions. Shapley proved that, if the coalition of all agents (the grand coalition) forms, and
there are no externalities, then there exists a unique payoff distribution that satisfies the axioms: (i) effi-
ciency—the entire value of the grand coalition should be distributed; (ii) symmetry—if an interchange
of two agents does not affect the value of any coalition, then these agents are symmetric and should
receive equal payoffs; (iii) null-player axiom—an agent with no marginal contribution to any coalition
should receive no payoff; and (iv) additivity—the division scheme should be additive over games. The
strength of the Shapley value derives from the fact that, although the above axioms are simple and
intuitive, there is no other payoff division scheme for characteristic function games that satisfies all
four of them. As a matter of fact, a number of alternative axiomatizations again uniquely yield the
Shapley value (e.g., Myerson’s [25] balanced-contribution axiomatization, Young’s [32] monotonicity
axiomatization, Hart & Mas-Colell’s [16] potential-function axiomatization). Unfortunately, for many
classes of cooperative games, computing the Shapley value is a computationally intractable problem,
and considerable efforts have therefore been devoted to developing efficient heuristics or approximation
algorithms [7].
Given the significance of the Shapley value, it is very natural to ask how it might be adapted or
adjusted to partition function games. However, when externalities are present, the central notion of the
marginal contribution can be defined in a variety of ways. As a result, to date, a number of marginal-
ity measures (hereafter, “marginalities”) have been proposed in the literature. This proliferation of
marginalities raises an interesting question: for any given way of measuring marginal contribution,
which axioms are required to obtain a unique value for the game? To date, the only general answer to
this question has been given by Fujinaka [13] for Young’s monotonicity axiomatization. However, for
most marginalities it has been unknown how to obtain a unique extension of the Shapley value to games
with externalities using the four original axioms, or whether this was even possible. This situation has
led to a range of new and increasingly exotic axioms being proposed. However, these new axiomati-
zations tend to be complex, losing the simplicity and intuitiveness of Shapley’s original four axioms.
Furthermore, some axiomatizations are not based on marginality, and for these, it is unclear how to
approximate a resulting value. In fact, no algorithm to approximate any extension of the Shapley value
to games with externalities has been proposed to date.
Given this background, our contributions are twofold:
• In Section 3 we prove that, given any well-defined1 marginal contribution, Shapley’s original four
axioms in fact imply a unique value for games with externalities (an extended Shapley value).
With this general theorem, we show that not only can values proposed by Macho-Stadler et
al.[20], McQuillin[21] and Bolger [5] be derived from Shapley’s axioms, but that Shapley’s
axiomatization is equivalent to Young’s monotonicity axiomatization in games with externalities.
• Based on the general formula that, given any marginality, computes the extended Shapley value,
1See Section 2 for more details.
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we present in Section 4 the first algorithm to approximate extensions of the Shapley value to
games with externalities.
2 Preliminary Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of players. A coalition, S, is any non-empty subset of N . A partition,
P , is any set of disjoint coalitions whose union is N . For technical convenience, we will assume that
∅∈P for every partition P . A pair (S, P ), where P is a partition ofN and S∈P , is called an embedded
coalition. The set of all partitions and the set of all embedded coalitions over N are denoted by P and
EC respectively.
A game v (in partition-function form) is given by a function that associates a real number with
every embedded coalition, i.e., v :EC→ R. A game has externalities if the value of any coalition
depends on the arrangement of outside agents (i.e., there exist two partitions P1, P2 containing S such
that v(S, P1) 6=v(S, P2)). Otherwise, we say that the game is without externalities. Such games can be
represented in characteristic-function form: vˆ : 2N → R. As is customary in the literature, we assume
that the grand coalition will form (i.e., the coalition N of all players). Then the outcome (value) of the
game is a vector that distributes the value of the grand coalition to players.
The set of all permutations of set N (i.e., one-to-one mappings from N to itself) will be denoted
by Ω(N). Formally, pi ∈ Ω(N) is a function, although as common in the combinatorics, we will
sometimes identify it with an ordering: (pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(|N |)). We will denote the set of agents that
appear in this order after i by Cpii , i.e., C
pi
i
def
= {pi(j) | j > pi−1(i)} (pi−1(i) is the place of i in the
order).
We use a shorthand notation for set subtraction and union operations: N−S
def
= N \S, and S+{i} def=
S ∪ {i}; we often omit brackets and simply write S+i. Finally, to model the partition obtained by the
transfer of agent i to coalition T in partition P we introduce the following notation:
τTi (P )
def
= P \ {P (i), T} ∪ {P (i)−i, T+i},
where P (i) denotes i’s coalition in P .
2.1 The Shapley value
In coalitional games with no externalities, the marginal contribution of agent i ∈ S to coalition S is
defined as the difference between the value of S with and without i, i.e.,
vˆ(S)− vˆ(S \ {i}).
We will denote the vector of all marginal contributions of i to all coalitions S ⊆ N \ {i} in game vˆ by
mci(vˆ).
Now, assume that the agents leave a certain meeting point in a randomly selected order pi. Agent
i leaves the set Cpii and decreases the value of (the coalition in) the meeting point by his marginal
contribution. Then, the Shapley value of agent i ∈ N is the expected marginal contribution of this
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agent over all permutations pi ∈ Ω(N).2 Formally:
ϕi(vˆ) =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Ω(N)
vˆ(Cpii ∪ {i})− vˆ(Cpii ).
Shapley [28] famously proved that this value is the only payoff distribution scheme that satisfies the
following four desirable axioms (we state them below in the general form so that they can also be used
for games with externalities):
• Efficiency (the entire available payoff is distributed among agents): ∑i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N, {N, ∅})
for every game v;
• Symmetry (payoffs do not depend on the agents’ names): ϕ(pi(v)) = pi(ϕ)(v) for every game v
and permutation pi ∈ Ω(N);3
• Additivity (the sum of payoffs in two separate games equals the payoff in a combined game):
ϕ(v1 +v2) = ϕ(v1)+ϕ(v2) for all the games v1, v2 and (v1 +v2)(S, P )
def
= v1(S, P )+v2(S, P );
• Null-Player Axiom (agents that never contribute to the value of any coalition, i.e., his marginal
contribution vector is the zero vector, should get nothing) : mci(v) = ~0 ⇒ ϕi(v) = 0 for every
game v and agent i ∈ N .
2.2 Extension to games with externalities
Formalizing the notion of marginal contribution is not straightforward for games with externalities.
The issue is that the change of value caused by an agent leaving a coalition depends on the partition
in which it is embedded. It is also important which coalition the agent joined. For instance, given a
three-player game v, consider agent 2’s contribution to coalition {1, 2} in partition {{1, 2}, {3}, ∅}.
As the values v({1}, {{1}, {2}, {3}, ∅}), v({1}, {{1}, {2, 3}, ∅}) may differ, agent 2 leaving coalition
{1, 2} may result in a bigger or smaller loss for the coalition {1, 2}. The loss in value caused by
the transfer of i from coalition S embedded in partition P to the coalition T can be understood as
v(S, P )− v(S−i, τTi (P )). We will refer to such a loss as an elementary marginal contribution.
Now, various authors defined their marginal contributions as different combinations of elementary
marginal contributions. For instance, Pham Do and Norde derived their externality-free value by assum-
ing that only such elementary marginal contributions matter in which an agent, after leaving a coalition,
becomes a singleton. Conversely, Bolger assigned equal importance to all elementary marginal contri-
butions and Macho-Stadler et al. assumed that this importance depends on the size of the coalition the
agent joins.
2Note that typically the intuition behind the Shapley value is presented as a process of entering the coalition. We adopt a
reverse convention as more convenient for games with externalities.
3 As permutation pi is formally a mapping from N to itself, a permutation of a set is an image of S: pi(S) def= {pi(i) |
i ∈ S} and a permutation of an embedded coalition is defined as follows: pi(S, P ) def= (pi(S), {pi(T ) | T ∈ P}). Then, a
permutation of a function (e.g., game v or value ϕ) is pi(f)(a) def= f(pi(a)) for f : A → B and a ∈ A. Intuitively, value
of (S, P ) in permuted game pi(v) equals the value of an embedded coalition obtained by replacing all players i from (S, P )
with pi(i). For example, if pi exchange 1 and 2, then pi(v)({{1}, {2, 3}}) = v({{2}, {1, 3}}).
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Of course, these combinations represent just a few of the ways in which they can be combined
together. Since our aim is to accommodate all such possibilities, we will use in this paper a general
definition of the marginal contribution in games with externalities introduced by Fujinaka [13]. Intu-
itively, in this definition, the marginal contribution of i is a weighted average of all possible elementary
marginal contributions of i. Let αi denote the weight of i, and let α
def
= 〈αi〉i∈N . Then:
[mcαi (v)](S, P )
def
=
∑
T∈P−S
αi(S−i, τTi (P )) · [v(S, P )− v(S−i, τTi (P ))].
Now, for weights α to be well defined, it is required that they are non negative4, and that they do not
depend on the agents’ names (to satisfy symmetry). Finally, for normalization, it is assumed that their
sum equals one for every embedded coalition. Formally, weights αi : {(S, P ) ∈ EC | i 6∈ S} → [0, 1]
satisfy:
• αi(S, P ) = αpi(i)(pi(S), pi(P )) for every permutation pi ∈ Ω(N) and (S, P ) ∈ EC such that
i 6∈ S;
• ∑T∈P−S αi(S−i, τTi (P )) = 1 for every (S, P ) ∈ EC such that i ∈ S.
Weights α have a natural interpretation: they represent a probability that a transfer of i from S to
another coalition in P takes place. Obviously, all the definitions of marginal contributions proposed in
the literature fall within this general definition [5, 26, 20, 17, 29]. The definition of marginal contribu-
tion corresponding to a given weighting α will be called α-marginality and Null-Player Axiom based
on α-marginality will be denoted Null-Player Axiomα.
3 Uniqueness
In this section, for every weighting α, we define a corresponding extension of the Shapley value to
games with externalities, denoted ϕα, and show that it is the unique solution that meets Shapley’s four
original axioms. The intuition for ϕα is similar to that for the original Shapley value. Specifically,
assume that the agents leave a certain meeting point in a random order and divide themselves into
groups (i.e., coalitions) outside. The agent that leaves joins any of the groups outside or creates a
new group, each with a certain probability. By doing so, he decreases the value of the coalition in
the meeting point (embedded in the partition of other agents) by his elementary marginal contribution.
Now, the payoff of this agent is the expected value of his elementary marginal contributions over all
permutations and partitions.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique value ϕα that satisfies Efficiency, Symmetry, Additivity and Null-
Player Axiomα for every α. Moreover, the value ϕα satisfies the following formula:
ϕαi (v) =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Ω(N)
∑
P∈P
prαpi (P ) · [v(Cpii ∪ {i}, P[Cpii ∪{i}])− v(Cpii , P[Cpii ])] (1)
4Otherwise, agents with only positive (negative) elementary marginal contributions could be assigned negative (positive)
payoff.
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where P[S]
def
= {T \ S | T ∈ P} ∪ {S} denotes the partition obtained from P by transferring all i ∈ S
to a new coalition and prαpi (P )
def
=
∏
i∈N αi(C
pi
i , P[Cpii ]).
Proof: The above theorem can be proved either directly from the Shapley’s original axioms or in-
directly by showing the equivalence between Shapley’s and Young’s axiomatizations for games with
externalities and invoking Fujinaka’s theorem of uniqueness for Young’s axiomatization. We chose the
direct proof and construct it as follows. First we prove that ϕα satisfies all four axioms. Then, we show
that this is the only such value.
Part 1: We will examine axioms one by one.
• Efficiency: for any permutation pi and partition P , the elementary marginal contributions add up
to v(N, {N, ∅}); thus:∑
i∈N
ϕαi (v) =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Ω(N)
∑
P∈P
prαpi (P ) ·
∑
i∈N
[v(Cpii ∪ {i}, P[Cpii ∪{i}])− v(Cpii , P[Cpii ])]
=
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Ω(N)
∑
P∈P
prαpi (P ) · v(N, {N, ∅}) = v(N, {N, ∅}),
where the last transformation comes from the fact that prαpi (P ) represents the probability that P
will form and this probability depends on order of agents pi. Thus,
∑
P∈P pr
α
pi (P ) = 1 for every
permutation pi.
• Symmetry: formula (1) does not favor any player, hence permutation of coalitions’ values will
permute payoffs accordingly.
• Additivity: formula (1) is clearly additive as ϕαi (v1 + v2) can be split into two expressions
representing ϕαi (v1) and ϕ
α
i (v2).
• Null-Player Axiomα: to see that ϕα satisfies the Null-Player Axiomα we will calculate the prob-
ability of a given elementary marginal contribution v(S, P )− v(S−i, τTi (P )) using formula (1).
A transfer from (S, P ) will occur only in permutations, where agents fromN \S (and only them)
leave before agent i. For one permutation of agents fromN \S, i.e., pi ∈ Ω(N \S), the probabil-
ity that (S, P ) will form equals prαpi (S, P ) =
∏
j∈N−S αj(C
pi
j , P[Cpij ]). Moreover, the probability
of transfer to T equals αi(S−i, τTi (P )). Finally, the permutation and arrangement of the remain-
ing players does not have an impact on the value (there are (|S| − 1)! such permutations). Now,
if we collect all transfers from a given embedded coalition (S, P ) we get the following formula:
ϕαi (v)
def
=
∑
(S,P )∈EC,i∈S
(|S| − 1)!
|N |!
∑
pi∈Ω(N−S)
prαpi (S, P ) · [mcαi (v)](S, P ).
Part 2: Now, we will show that ϕα is the only value which satisfies all four of Shapley’s original
axioms. To this end, let us introduce the class of simple games 〈e(S,P )〉(S,P )∈EC :
e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ )
def
=
{
1 if(S, P ) = (S˜, P˜ ),
0 otherwise.
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This class forms a basis of the game space, i.e., every game can be defined as a linear combina-
tion of games e(S,P ): v =
∑
(S,P )∈EC v(S, P ) · e(S,P ). Based on Additivity, we have ϕ(v) =∑
(S,P )∈EC ϕ(v(S, P ) · e(S,P )); thus, it is enough to prove that axioms imply a unique value in simple
game e(S,P ) (multiplied by a scalar). For this purpose, we will use the reverse induction on the size of
S, i.e., we will show that the value of game e(S,P ) can be calculated from values of simple games for
bigger coalitions: e(S˜,P˜ ) where |S˜| > |S|. Our base case when |S| = |N | comes from the Efficiency
and Symmetry: ϕi(c · e(N,{N,∅})) = c|N | for every i.
First, let (S, P ) be any embedded coalition and assume that i 6∈ S. Let us consider game v˜ com-
bined from two simple games:
v˜ = c · [αi(S, P ) · e(S+i,τSi (P )) + e(S,P )]
It is easy to observe that agent i’s marginal contribution to (S+i, τSi (P )) equals zero, as with all other
marginal contributions. Thus, from Null-Player Axiom ϕi(v˜) = 0 and from Additivity:
ϕi(c · e(S,P )) = −ϕi(c · αi(S, P ) · e(S+i,τSi (P ))) (2)
Now, let us assume otherwise, that i ∈ S and |S| < |N | (we already considered simple game
e(N,{N,∅})). From Efficiency, we have that v(N, {N, ∅}) = 0. Thus, we can evaluate the sum of payoffs
of agents from S as the opposite number to the sum of payoffs of outside agents (−∑j 6∈S ϕj(c·e(S,P ))).
This sum, in turn, can be calculated with formula (2). Now, based on the Symmetry, all agents from S
divide their joint payoff equally.
ϕi(c · e(S,P )) = 1|S|
∑
k∈S
ϕk(c · e(S,P )) = − 1|S|
∑
j 6∈S
ϕj(c · e(S,P ))
=
1
|S|
∑
j 6∈S
ϕj(c · αj(S, P ) · e(S+j ,τSj (P ))
Thus, we provided two recursive equations for ϕi(c · e(S,P )) for both cases: i ∈ S and i 6∈ S. This
concludes our proof.
Since formula (1) is the same as the one derived by Fujinaka [13] based on the Young’s monotonic-
ity axiomatization, we conclude that both axiomatizations are equivalent:
Corollary 1 Value ϕ satisfies Shapley’s axiomatization (Efficiency, Symmetry, Additivity and Null-
Player Axiomα) if and only if it satisfies Young’s axiomatization (Efficiency, Symmetry and Marginality
Axiomα).5
4 An Approximation Algorithm
We now present our algorithm for approximating the extended Shapley value for any weighting α. We
will use the following sampling process. Let the population be the set of pairs (pi, P ) ∈ Ω(N) × P .
5This axiom is yet another way of introducing marginality to the axiomatization.
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Algorithm 1 Approximation of ϕα
1: for all i ∈ N do ϕˆαi ← 0; end for
2: for i← 1 to m do
3: pi ← random permutation from Ω(N);
4: P ← random partition from P with probability prαpi (P );
5: S ← ∅;
6: for j ← |N | downto 1 do
7: vbefore ← v(S, P );
8: transfer player pi−1(j) in P to S;
9: vafter ← v(S, P );
10: ϕˆαpi(j) ← ϕˆαpi(j) + vafter − vbefore;
11: end for
12: end for
13: for all i ∈ N do ϕˆαi ← ϕˆαi /m; end for
14: return ϕˆα;
In one sample, given permutation pi and partition P , we will measure for each agent i his elementary
marginal contribution. As visible in the formula for ϕα in Theorem 1, elementary marginal contri-
butions do not occur with the same probability. Thus, to obtain an unbiased estimate we will use
probability sampling with the odds of selecting a given sample (pi, P ) equal prαpi (P )/|N |!. To this
end, we will select a random permutation (each with equal probability: 1/|N |!) and then select a par-
tition with probability prαpi (P ).
6 It is important to note that this probability depends on the definition
of marginality (hence the α in the superscript) and the difficulty of the sampling process may vary
depending on the definition adopted. We will address this issue later.
The pseudocode of this procedure is presented in Algorithm 1. Our procedure, which approximates
ϕα, is parametrized by the game v and number of samples m. We will discuss the required number of
samples at the end of this section. The main for-loop sums samples elementary marginal contributions
(variable ϕˆα). At the end, this sum is divided by the number of samples. To compute the players’
contribution we reverse the process of creating partition P from the grand coalition (according to the
intuition outlined before): we sequentially transfer players to the new (empty at start) coalition that
represents a meeting point and measure the change of its value.
Now, let us focus on the randomized part of our algorithm (lines 3-4). We generate a random
permutation using a well-known Knuth shuffle [10]. As mentioned before, the selection of a partition
depends on the definition of α weights. That is why we are able to approximate all (marginality-based)
extensions of the Shapley value and, in particular, those already proposed in the literature:
Externality-free value: In the simplest concept of externality-free value, the whole probability is
assigned to creation of a new coalition [26]:
αfreei (S, P )
def
= 1 if {i} ∈ P ,
and αfreei (S, P )
def
= 0 otherwise. Thus, the only partition with non-zero probability is the partition of
6Recall that, intuitively, prαpi (P ) represents the probability that P will form if players leave the meeting point in order pi.
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singletons: P = {{i} | i ∈ N} and selection of P is straightforward.
Full-of-externalities value: To obtain McQuillin’s [21] value, Skibski [29] used the marginality that
complements the previous one:7
αfulli (S, P )
def
=
1
|P | − 1 if {i} 6∈ P or P = {N−i, {i}},
and αfulli (S, P )
def
= 0 otherwise. Again, the random selection simplifies to generating one specific
partition, as only the grand coalition P = {N} has non-zero probability.
Bolger value: Bolger [5] was first to propose axiomatization based on the marginality principle. In his
definition of marginal contribution every transfer is equally likely:
αBi (S, P )
def
=
1
|P−i| .
The probability of partition prα
B
pi (P ) depends on the order in which the agents leave.
8 To select a
partition with adequate probability, we simulate the process of leaving as follows: we take agents from
the permutation one by one and uniformly select one of the existing coalitions to join or a new one to
create.
Macho-Stadler et al. value: In the value proposed by Macho-Stadler et al. [20], the weights of the
transfer depend on the size of coalitions:
αMSti (S, P )
def
=
|P (i)| − 1
|N | − |S| if |P (i)| > 1,
and αMSti (S, P )
def
= 1|N |−|S| otherwise, where P (i) denotes coalition with agent i in P . Thus, the
numerator is equal to the size of the coalition that agent joined (or 1 when this coalition is empty).9
Our approach to generate a random partition comes from the observation that probability prα
MSt
pi (P ) =∏
T∈P |T−1|!
|N |! equals the odds that a given partition will occur from the decomposition into disjoint cycles
of a randomly selected permutation. Thus, we can again generate a random permutation with Knuth
shuffle and divide players into coalitions according to the cycles of this permutation.
Hu and Yang value: Hu and Yang [17] designed their value in such a way that probabilities of every
partition are equal: prα
HY
pi (P ) =
1
|P | . Thus,
αHYi (S, P )
def
=
|{P˜ ∈ P | P˜[S] = P}|
|{P˜ ∈ P | P˜[S∪{i}] = P}|
.
7The second condition P = {N−i, {i}} is a special case in which creating a new coalition has non-zero probability. This
comes from the fact that creating a new coalition is the agent’s only option.
8For example, consider prα
B
pi ({N−i, {i}}). If i is the last agent in permutation pi then prα
B
pi ({N−i, {i}}) =
1
1
1
2
1
2
· · · 1
2
= 1
2|N|−1 . On the other hand, if it is the first one: pr
αB
pi ({N−i, {i}}) = 11 12 13 · · · 13 = 12·3|N|−2 .
9We note that these weights correspond to the probabilities in Chinese restaurant process [2], well known in probability
theory.
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Figure 1: Performance evaluation of Algorithm 1.
To generate a random partition we introduce the following technique. We will create the partition
successively, for each agent selecting the coalition to join with probability that corresponds to the
number of partitions of N that cover (i.e., respect) the obtained partial partition. For example, player
2 will join agent 1 with probability Bell(n−1)Bell(n) . This is because both agents appear in Bell(n − 1) of
Bell(n) partitions together. Now, the number of partitions of N that cover given partial partition Pk
of k agents depends only on the number of coalitions in Pk. Thus, all the probabilities of transfers
to the existing coalitions are the same. Based on this analysis, we will first randomly decide whether
the player forms a new coalition and if not, we will pick any existing coalition (all with the same
probability). We note here that the probability of creating a new coalition by player k + 1 entering
partition Pk can be precalculated, i.e., calculated once, before the sampling. This can be done inO(n2)
time using dynamic programing. What is also important from the computational point of view, this
ratio is not less that 1|N | , thus we avoid precision problems that arises in other methods proposed in the
literature [30].
4.1 Error analysis
Let us briefly discuss the number of samples needed to obtain a required precision of the result. It is
clear from the Theorem 1 that the estimator is unbiased: E[ϕˆαi ] = ϕ
α
i . The variance equals V [ϕˆ
α
i ] =
σ2
m
where m is the number of samples and σ2 is the variance of the population:
σ2 =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Ω(N)
∑
P∈P
prαpi (P ) · ([v(Cpii ∪ {i}, P[Cpii ∪{i}])− v(Cpii , P[Cpii ])]− ϕαi (v))2.
Now, based on the central limit theorem, ϕˆαi ∼ N(ϕαi , σ
2
m ). Assume we want to obtain an error not
bigger than with the probability not smaller than 1−β, i.e., we need to satisfy the following inequality:
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EFF SYM ADD NPα MARGα LIN WNP SSSI WM
GEN
REC CAR
OLG
ECA
FEFF
ECS
ECAD
ECNP
CPO
LEFF
OW
CNS
SCN
SCS ME
MARGINAL VALUES - ALL CAN BE DERIVED FROM SHAPLEY’S ORIGINAL AXIOMS (THEOREM 1)
(A) AXIOMATIZATIONS BASED ON MARGINALITY
Pham Do & Norde 2007 × × × ◦
Hu & Yang 2009 × × × ◦
Skibski 2011 × × × ◦ ×
Bolger 1989 × × × ◦ × ×
De Clippel & Serrano 2008 × × ◦
(B) NON-MARGINALITY AXIOMATIZATIONS
Macho-Stadler et al. 2007 × × × × × ×
McQuillin 2008 × × × × × × ×
OTHER VALUES
Myerson 1977 × × ×
Albizuri et al. 2005 × × × ×
Hafalir 2007 × ×
Maskin 2007 × ×
Grabisch & Funaki 2012 × × × × ×
Table 1: Existing axiomatizations (that guarantee uniqueness) for various extensions of Shapley value to games
with externalities (× denotes the axiom used and ◦ denotes a special case of the axiom). Axioms: Efficiency
(EFF), Symmetry (SYM), Additivity (ADD), Null-Player Axiomα (NPα), Marginalityα (MARGα), Linearity
(LIN), Weak Null-player Axiom (WNP), Strong Symmetry (SS), Similar Influence (SI), Weak Monotonicity
(WM), Rules Of Generalization (GEN), Recursion (REC), Carrier (CAR), Oligarchy Axiom (OLG), Embed-
ded Coalition Anonymity (ECA), Fully Efficient (FEFF), Efficient-Cover Anonymous (ECS), Efficient-Cover
Additive (ECAD), Efficient-Cover Null-player Axiom (ECNP), Coalition Pareto Optimality (CPO), Limited
Efficiency (LEFF), Opportunity Wages (OW), Consistency (CNS), Null-Player Axiom for the Scenario-Value
(SCN), Symmetry for the Scenario-Value (SCS), Markovian and Ergodic Axiom (ME)
P (|ϕˆαi − ϕαi | ≤ ) ≥ 1 − β. But P (|ϕˆαi − ϕαi | ≤ ) = Φ( ·
√
m
σ ) − Φ(−·
√
m
σ ) = 2 · Φ( ·
√
m
σ ) − 1
where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Therefore,
Φ( ·
√
m
σ ) ≥ 1 − β2 and finally: m ≥ σ
2
2
· (Φ−1(1 − β2 ))2, where Φ−1(x) is the quantile function,
i.e., P (X ≥ Φ−1(x)) = x for X ∼ N(0, 1). For example, for the uncertainty β = 0.01 holds
Φ−1(0.995) ≈ 2.57.
Next, we need to find an upper bound for σ2. To this end, following Castro et al. [6], we will
assume that we know some limits mini,maxi on the player’s marginal contribution, i.e., mini ≤
v(Cpii ∪ {i}, P[Cpii ∪{i}]) − v(Cpii , P[Cpii ]) ≤ maxi for every pi ∈ Ω(N) and P ∈ P . Then, the σ2 is
maximized when all marginal contributions equal mini or maxi, and the average equals mini+maxi2
(to achieve this, the sum of probabilities of maximal marginal contributions must equal the sum of
probabilities of minimal marginal contributions). Finally, σ2 ≤ (maxi−mini)24 .
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5 Performance evaluation
We test our algorithm on two distributions popular in the literature on coalitional games [19]:
• normal: v(S, P ) = |S| · N(1, 0.1); here, the bounds are: mini = −n · 0.6 + 1.3 and maxi =
n · 0.6 + 0.7.
• uniform: v(S, P ) = |S| · U(0, 1); here, in a extreme case, mini = −n+ 1 and maxi = n.
where, in the case of the normal distribution, we place the following additional limits: 0.7 ≤ N(1, 0.1) ≤
1.3.10
Figure 1(a) presents the time performance of our algorithm for n = 8, 9, . . . , 15 and compares it to
the exact brute-force approach—the only known alternative.11 For n = 11 our approximation algorithm
outperforms the exact brute-force at the first time. Already for n = 15, it would take almost 4 hours to
compute the exact output (extrapolated result), whereas our algorithm returns the approximated solution
in less than 7 seconds (with the guaranteed error of 0.1).
Figure 1(b) shows that the maximal error obtained from the random game is a few times lower
than the theoretical error (for both distributions). For instance, for game of 12 players, which takes the
brute-force algorithm more than 37 seconds to calculate, the maximal error of 0.018 is obtained after
1.47 seconds (65K samples). Moreover, the error clearly tends to zero, which shows that our estimator
is indeed unbiased.
6 Conclusions and related work
We proved in this paper that, for any well-defined marginal contribution, Shapley’s original four axioms
imply a unique value for games with externalities. Our theorem covers all previous values that can be
based on marginality. Building upon this we develop the first approximation algorithm to compute such
values and evaluate its performance.
We summarize the extensions of Shapley value to games with externalities in Table 1. First, four au-
thors proposed their own definitions of marginality, a subcases of α-marginality, and proved uniqueness
based on the marginality axiomatizations [26, 17, 29, 5]. To this end, some strengthen standard axioms:
Skibski added Linearity to the standard Shapley’s axiomatization; Bolger used Young’s axiomatization,
but added Linearity and the Weak Null-Player Axiom. De Clippel and Serrano [8] studied externality-
free marginality proposed by Pham Do & Norde applied to Young’s axiomatization. All above unique-
ness results are special cases of Theorem 1. Furthermore, Macho-Stadler et al. [20] and McQuillin
[21] proposed new values based on more complex axiomatizations. Although their axiomatizations
move away from the concept of marginality both of these values can be obtained using marginality
axiomatization. Other authors used axiomatizations which conflict with Shapley’s understanding of
fairness: Myerson’s [24] value may assign negative payoff to a player from the only non-zero coalition
in a game; Albizuri et al.’s [1] and Grabish-Funaki’s [14] values grant players with no strength non-
zero payoffs; and Hafalir [15] and Maskin [11] questioned that the grand coalition forms and declined
Efficiency.
10These instances only happen with probability 0.14%.
11The simulations run on a PC-i7, 3.4 GHz and 8 GB of RAM.
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Finally, we mention the relevant computer science literature that includes works on concise repre-
sentations of games with externalities (e.g. [18, 23]) and approximation algorithms for games with no
externalities ([12, 3]).
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